Maternal Liability for Prenatal Injury Arising from Substance Abuse during Pregnancy: The Possibility of a Cause of Action in Pennsylvania by Kennedy, Mary K.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 29 
Number 3 The Pennsylvania Issue Article 5 
1991 
Maternal Liability for Prenatal Injury Arising from Substance 
Abuse during Pregnancy: The Possibility of a Cause of Action in 
Pennsylvania 
Mary K. Kennedy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mary K. Kennedy, Maternal Liability for Prenatal Injury Arising from Substance Abuse during Pregnancy: 
The Possibility of a Cause of Action in Pennsylvania, 29 Duq. L. Rev. 553 (1991). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol29/iss3/5 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Maternal Liability for Prenatal Injury Arising from
Substance Abuse During Pregnancy: The
Possibility of a Cause of Action in Pennsylvania
Mary K. Kennedy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ..................................... 553
II. Defining the Problem: The Effects of Maternal Drug
Use During Pregnancy ........................... 555
A . N arcotics ................................... 555
B . A lcohol ..................... I .. ............. 557
C. Social Im pact ............................... 558
III. The Development of Prenatal Injury Law in Pennsyl-
v a n ia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 2
IV. The Abrogation of Parent-Child Tort Immunity in
P ennsylvania .................................... 565
V. Issues Concerning the Child's Cause of Action ...... 568
A. The Duty to the Child ....................... 570
B. The Standard of Care: A Balance Between the
Mother's Rights and Those of the Child ....... 572
V I. C onclusion ...................................... 576
I. INTRODUCTION
The medical profession has recognized the fetus as an individual
patient separate from the mother for longer than the law has con-
sidered it an entity deserving of legal protection in its own right.1
In the early prenatal injury cases after Dietrich v Inhabitants of
Northampton,2 courts denied recovery on the grounds that a fetus
was a part of the mother. 3 Today, all states recognize the child's
right to bring an action against a third party for negligent inflic-
1. See Dietrich v Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass 14 (1884) and note 137 and
accompanying text.
2. 138 Mass 14 (1884).
3. Dietrich, 138 Mass at 14.
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tion of a prenatal injury.4
Injuries that affect the development of an unborn child may re-
sult from the negligence of outsiders or even the parents them-
selves-particularly the mother. Medical research is rapidly estab-
lishing a causal relationship between various factors within a
woman's control and subsequent defects and complications occur-
ring in her child." These factors include the use of cigarettes, alco-
hol, various drugs, and the lack of a proper diet.
With its decision in Grodin v Grodin,6 Michigan became the first
state to allow a child to sue his mother for a prenatal injury. The
court found that a mother has a duty to her unborn child and that
breach of this duty could result in liability to the child. 7 In permit-
ting actions that protect the welfare of the fetus by ordering medi-
cal care, courts have opened the possibility of creating an adver-
sarial relationship between a pregnant woman and her unborn
child.' On one side is the right of a woman to her individual free-
dom, including the right to control her body; on the other side is
the right of an infant to be born healthy. Holding a woman liable
to her child limits her freedom to control her life; but, it has been
argued, when a woman has decided not to terminate her preg-
nancy, society has a legitimate interest in promoting the quality of
life of the unborn child, and in prohibiting or restricting conduct
likely to harm him."
Before 1963 and the decision by the State of Wisconsin to abro-
gate the intrafamilial tort immunity rule in Goller v White,10 such
suits would have been prohibited. However, with the abrogation of
the parent-child immunity rule in many states and the recognition
of maternal liability in Grodin, there exists a very real possibility
that suits against mothers for prenatal injuries may become gener-
ally accepted.
This article will pursue the following course: first, a look at the
4. Carol Ann Simon, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 Colum J Law & Soc
Probs 47, 47 (1978).
5. Comment, Maternal Liability: Courts Strive to Keep Doors Open to Fetal Protec-
tion - But Can They Succeed?, 20 John Marshall L Rev 747, 748 (1987).
6. 102 Mich App 396, 301 NW2d 869 (1980) (child sued his mother for taking tetracy-
cline while she was pregnant which caused him to have brown teeth).
7. Grodin, 301 NW2d at 870-71.
8. See generally, Kenneth Jost, Mother Versus Child, ABA Journal 84 (April 1989).
9. Jeffrey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the
Potentiality of Human Life, 22 Harv J on Legis 97, 114 (1985); Note, Maternal Substance
Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection to the Fetus, 60 S Cal L Rev 1209, 1223
(1987).
10. 20 Wis 2d 402, 122 NW2d 193 (1963).
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specific problem of maternal substance abuse and its effects on un-
born children; second, a recounting of the development of the ar-
eas of prenatal injury law and the abrogation of the intrafamilial
tort doctrine in Pennsylvania; third, a discussion of a child's possi-
ble cause of action in Pennsylvania, in terms of striking a proper
balance of interests between the mother and child in developing a
duty and determining when that duty has been breached. Finally,
this note concludes that Pennsylvania should allow such suits
when a mother's conduct shows conscious disregard for the welfare
of her unborn child, and that substance abuse by a pregnant wo-
man should constitute this type of conduct.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE EFFECTS OF MArERNAL DRUG
USE DURING PREGNANCY
A. Narcotics
A developing fetus depends entirely on his mother for nourish-
ment, oxygen, and growth. Everything needed for his sustenance is
provided by the mother through the placenta. This life-providing
channel is also a means by which a child may be harmed while in
utero.
Many prenatal injuries are caused by a disruption of the in-
trauterine environment,11 whether by some force exerted on the
mother's body, as in the instance of a tort committed by a third
party, or by the introduction of a teratogenic agent, as in the case
of the mother abusing a substance during pregnancy. A teratogenic
agent is a substance that has the ability to interfere with a mecha-
nism essential for the growth of the fetus, such that it causes a
birth defect-morphological, biochemical or behavioral-without
necessarily causing a similar disturbance in the mother.12 Terato-
genic agents may induce birth defects at any time during gesta-
tion,13 and their voluntary introduction by a pregnant woman is
one of the greatest threats to normal fetal development. 4
The greatest danger of congenital malformation due to the use of
a substance is from the third to tenth week of pregnancy. Although
11. Simon, 14 Colum L & Soc Probs at 47 (cited in note 4).
12. Black's Medical Dictionary 218 (West, 35th ed 1987); Loretta P. Finnegan, The
Effects of Narcotics and Alcohol on Pregnancy and the Newborn, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci
136, 140 (1981).
13. Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci' at 140 (cited in note 12).
14. Ron Beal, Can I Sue Mommy? An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Pre-
natal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 San Diego L Rev 325, 360 (1984).
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this risk is lower for an older fetus, a teratogen may cause brain
damage, growth retardation, behavioral disturbances, or even
death at any time.15 Another danger associated with maternal drug
use stems from the state of mind of the pregnant drug user. A
drug-dependent woman is on an emotional rollercoaster, alternat-
ing between euphoric highs and sick states when she is seeking an-
other "fix."' 6 She may have little or no concern for proper diet,
sleep or medical care, and can be prone to complications including
abortion, breech presentation, need for Cesarean section, intrauter-
ine death, and premature labor. 17
Any substance capable of passing through the placenta affects
the fetus, including heroin, 8 cocaine, marijuana, alcohol, and nico-
tine. This transfer increases with elevated maternal and fetal blood
flow through the placenta and greater placental age.19 The afore-
mentioned substances have been associated with premature birth
and low birth weight.20 Infants suffering from this growth retarda-
tion have a higher mortality rate than normal weight babies. 2'
Maternal drug use also can cause such defects as hydrocephalus,
interrupted aortic arch, malrotation of the intestines, cleft lip, and
multicystic kidney." Neonatal complications due to premature
birth include asphyxia, intracranial hemorrhage, and
hypoglycemia.23
Withdrawal from a substance is another complication that an in-
fant experiences within forty-eight hours of birth.24 The symptoms
of neonatal narcotic abstinence syndrome are the same as those
observed in adults suffering from withdrawal, and center on the
nervous, intestinal, and respiratory systems.2 5 The child exper-
iences tremors, hyperirritability, hyperactivity, yawning, sleepless-
15. Beal, 21 San Diego L Rev at 359 (cited in note 14); Black's Medical Dictionary 218
(cited in note 12).
16. Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci at 137 (cited in note 12).
17. Id.
18. Marcia Levine, The Right of the Fetus to be Born Free of Drug Addiction, 7 UCD
L Rev 45, 46 (1974).
19. Levine, 7 UCD L Rev at 46 (cited in note 18) (citing J. Marx, Drugs During Preg-
nancy: Do They Affect the Unborn Child?, 180 Science 174 (April 13, 1973)).
20. Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci at 138 (cited in note 12).
21. Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The Right of a Child Against its Mother, 10
Suffolk U L Rev 582, 600 (1976) (citing Lechtig, Delgado, Lasky, Yarbrough, Klein, Habicht,
Behar, Maternal Nutrition and Fetal Growth in Developing Countries, 129 Am J Dis Child
553 (1975)).
22. Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci at 140 (cited in note 12).
23. Id at 141.




ness, stuffy nose, vomiting, excessive sweating, fever, shrill crying,
sneezing, and twitching.
2
Even a mother's detoxification during pregnancy may be harm-
ful to the fetus because severe withdrawal can cause increased met-
abolic activity and oxygen consumption in the mother. This condi-
tion deprives the fetus of oxygen and induces fetal distress, and




Alcohol consumption during pregnancy is another major cause of
defects in the newborn. These defects occur in specific, cognizable
patterns which fall under the term "fetal alcohol syndrome" (here-
inafter "FAS") 2 8
One manifestation of FAS already discussed is growth retarda-
tion. Alcohol decreases the number of cells in the fetus during de-
velopment and results in a permanent deficit.2 9 The risk of this
occurring increases as the woman's consumption of alcohol in-
creases.30 Not only does growth retardation result in high mortality
in affected infants, it is also associated with decreased head cir-
cumference, impaired motor development, and mental retarda-
tion." Alcohol's greatest effects on growth occur during the third
trimester of pregnancy.
32
Fetal alcohol syndrome is the third leading cause of mental re-
tardation following Down's syndrome and spina bifida. 3 Studies
on intelligence, behavior, and malformation in FAS children have
shown an average intelligence quotient (hereinafter "I.Q.") of 65;
lower I.Q.s occur with greater malformations and higher I.Q.s are
associated with less severe deformities.34 The studies also found
26. Id.; Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci at 142 (cited in note 12); Note, 60 S Cal L
Rev at 1217 (cited in note 9).
27. Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci at 138 (cited in note 12).
28. Note, 60 S Cal L Rev at 1211 (cited in note 9).
29. Id at 1213.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci at 148 (cited in note 12).
32. Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci at 149 (cited in note 12).
33. Note, 60 S Cal L Rev at 1214 (cited in note 9) (citing Peter Gal and Martha K.
Sharpless, Fetal Drug Exposure - Behavioral Teratogenesis, 18 Drug Intelligence and
Clinical Pharmacy 184, 186 (1984)).
34. Note, 60 S Cal L Rev at 1214 (cited in note 9); Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci at
150 (cited in note 12).
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that physical -heights were correlated with intelligence.35
Behavioral and brain dysfunction problems that become appar-
ent as an FAS child grows include hyperactivity, short attention
span, diminished problem-solving ability, poor concentration,
delayed motor development, and cognitive and perceptual
problems.36 The most common physical abnormality is microceph-
aly, or an abnormally small skull.3 7 This is also connected with
growth deficiency and mental retardation. Other characteristics as-
sociated with FAS are strabismus, cardiac. murmurs, eye slits, low
nasal bridge, ridges between the nose and mouth, flat midface, and
posterior rotation of the ears. 8
C. Social Impact
While the medical effects of drug use during pregnancy have
been researched and are well-documented, authorities at the fed-
eral, state and local levels are only now beginning to realize the
tremendous costs involved in providing treatment, care, and educa-
tion for a rapidly growing population of children who were exposed
to various drugs while* in the womb. The National Center for
Health Statistic's National Hospital Discharge Survey estimated
that 9,101 infants nationwide were born with indications of mater-
nal drug use in 1986. By 1988, this number had grown to 13,765. 89
One expert has stated that while the number of drug-exposed
babies remains small, they are among the most expensive babies to
care for. 0 This is partially due to the fact that "drug and alcohol-
addicted women contribute the most to perinatal morbidity and
mortality. They are characterized by no or very little prenatal care
with a resultant incidence of 40% to 50% preterm birth."1 In
Pennsylvania, these women represent 5% to 35% of deliveries in
35. Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci at 151 (cited in note 12).
36. Id at 150.
37. Note, 60 S Cal L Rev at 1215 (cited in note 9).
38. Id at 1216. Finnegan, 362 Ann NY Acad Sci at 150 (cited in note 12).
39. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Finance,
US Senate, Drug Exposed Infants: A Generation at Risk 4 (1990): Medical records at two
hospitals in each of five cities - Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and San Antonio -
were reviewed to determine the extent of drug-exposed infants. Hospital, state, and social
services representatives were interviewed to assess the impact of these children on the medi-
cal and social services systems.
40. Miller, Addicted Infants and Their Mothers,.Zero to Three 20 (June, 1989).




hospitals across the state.42 Although estimates vary, hospital
charges for drug-exposed infants can be as much as four times
greater than those for infants with no indication of prenatal drug
exposure.43 Among drug-affected babies, costs can vary, especially
where there is low birthweight and prematurity requiring place-
ment in neonatal intensive care units. Approximately 28% of the
cocaine-exposed babies born in Philadelphia require admission to
such intensive care nurseries,"" which may cost as much as
$1,500.00 per day. "' According to one commentator, "The cost to
'graduate' a sick infant from the intensive care unit can be as high
as $150,000 for the first three months of life.'
' 6
Although substance-abusing pregnant women belong to all socio-
economic groups, in many instances drug-exposed infants are born
to mothers on Medicaid (a federal program which pays for medical
services rendered to low-income persons). Very often, however,
hospitals must absorb those costs in excess of what is reimbursed
by medical assistance programs. In California in 1988, the state's
Medicaid program and the California Children's Services Program
paid for only approximately three-fourths ($134 million) of the to-
tal health care costs of the state's drug-exposed infants ($178 mil-
lion). 47 In Philadelphia, an estimated 79% of the mothers giving
birth to cocaine-exposed infants are on medical assistance.'
Many drug-exposed infants stay in hospitals after their mothers
are discharged. In Philadelphia, 31% of these babies remain after
42. Finnegan, Special Currents: Maternal Addiction at 2 (cited in note 41).
43. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman at 27 (cited in note 39).
44. Philadelphia Perinatal Society and Philadelphia Department of Public Health,
One Thousand Babies: Philadelphia 1989. The introduction to the report reads:
During an eight week period in 1989, mother-infant charts from eight city hospitals
were reviewed to determine incidence of cocaine use, amount of prenatal care, inci-
dence of sexually transmitted disease, birth status of the infant, length of stay of the
infant, and disposition of the infant at the time of discharge from the hospital...
Determination of cocaine use was by self-report or positive urine screen.
Philadelphia Perinatal Society, One Thousand Babies.
45. Telephone interview with Loretta P. Finnegan, M.D.; Professor of Pediatrics and
Professor of Psychiatry and Human Behavior at Jefferson Medical College of Thomas Jef-
ferson University in Philadelphia; founder and Director of Family Center, a treatment
center for pregnant addicted women and their children at Jefferson Hospital; Associate Di-
rector of the Office for Treatment Improvement and Associate Director for Medical and
Clinical Affairs of the Office for Substance Abuse Prevention in the Alcohol, Drug Abuse,
and Mental Health Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(October 12, 1990).
46. Finnegan, Special Currents: Maternal Addiction at 2 (cited in note 41).
47. Staff of House Committee of Ways and Means, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, The
Enemy Within: Crack-cocaine and America's Families 63 (Comm Print 1990).
48. Philadelphia Perinatal Society, One Thousand Babies (cited in note 44).
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the release of their mothers. 9 While much of this is attributed to
medical reasons, a growing number of children are becoming
"boarder babies." These are children who remain in hospitals for
nonmedical reasons, most commonly because they have been aban-
doned by their mothers or, in some cases, social workers have de-
termined that the home environment is unacceptable due to paren-
tal drug abuse.5 0 Some of these children also test positive for
human immunodeficiency virus (hereinafter "HIV"). 51 The cost of
caring for a boarder baby may range from $200 to $500 a day, even
if the child has no medical complications and merely awaits place-
ment in foster care.52 Babies who are HIV-positive are even more
expensive to care for. Physicians at Washington, D.C., General
Hospital have estimated that the cost of caring for twenty-eight
boarder babies over a thirteen-month period was approximately
$1.8 million.
53
The effects of maternal substance abuse are keenly felt by the
child welfare system which, along with hospitals, must cope with
the problem of boarder babies. In Philadelphia, 10% of the drug-
exposed infants are discharged from the hospital to a place other
than their home.5 4 Other children are discharged to their families,
but may later enter the social services system because of the poor
environment and lack of care provided in a substance-abusing
home.55 Often an addicted mother will simply not be able to care
for a child born with medical problems or physical or mental disa-
bilities caused by her drug use during pregnancy.
Drug abusing parents are also a leading cause of child abuse and
neglect. In New York City, 59% of the fatalities associated with
abuse and neglect involving children previously abused occur
within the first six months of life. Frequently, these are drug-ex-
posed babies." In Philadelphia, parental drug use accounts for
about 70% of the child abuse reports 7 and 50% of the children
4 9. Id.
50. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman at 30 (cited in note 39).
51. Finnegan, Special Currents: Maternal Addiction at 1 (cited in note 41).
52. Staff of House Committee of Ways and Means, The Enemy Within at 63 (cited in
note 47).
53. Id at 64.
54. Philadelphia Perinatal Society, One Thousand Babies (cited in note 44).
55. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman at 7 (cited in note 39).
56. Finnegan, Special Currents: Maternal Addiction at 2 (cited in note 41).
57. Hearing before the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Committee on Youth
and Aging, Substance-Exposed Mothers and Their Children (1989) (statement of Donald F.




Whether these children enter foster care directly from the hospi-
tal or at some later point, their ever-growing numbers are placing a
great strain on the system. Many foster parents may. be unwilling
or unable to care for a child with disabilities or medical problems
caused by prenatal drug use. When foster care placements are
available, the cost per child in Philadelphia can range from $23 a
day for general foster care to $38 a day for children who may have
some mental or emotional disabilities. For a child with medical
complications, this cost can range from $42 to $85 a day."
In addition to the costly medical care they require and the in-
creasing strain they place on the child welfare system, drug-ex-
posed children present problems to the educational system as well.
Although definitive information is not yet available, researchers
predict that children who were exposed to various substances in
the womb will need special educational services. These services
cannot be provided by the average day care, preschool or kinder-
garten classroom, as the children may have long-term learning and
developmental deficiencies that could result in underachievement
and excessive dropout rates. In turn, these long-term deficiencies
may lead to adult illiteracy and unemployment.6 0
Research on the relationship between prenatal drug exposure
and children's developmental and learning disabilities has been
hindered by certain difficulties, for example, distinguishing be-
tween the impact of a child's rearing in a substance-abusing envi-
ronment and that of the prenatal exposure to drugs."1 Nonetheless,
a study performed at the University of California, San Diego
showed that 25% of drug-exposed children had developmental de-
lays and 40% experienced neurologic difficulties that could affect
the ability to socialize and function within a school environment.6 2
While the effects of prenatal drug and alcohol use on children are
varied, some of the characteristics of children who are drug-ex-
posed include poor coordination, speech and language delays, at-
58. Tracy, Talbert, and Steinschneider, Women, Babies, and Drugs: Family-Centered
Treatment Options 6 (Center for Policy Alternatives, National Conference of State Legisla-
tures 1990).
59. Telephone interview with Vic Compher, Philadelphia Department of Human Ser-
vices (October 29, 1990).
60. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman at 7-8 (cited in note 39);
Staff of House Committee of Ways and Means, The Enemy Within at 67 (cited in note 47).
61. Staff of House Committee of Ways and Means, The Enemy Within at 67 (cited in
note 47).
62. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman at 34 (cited in note 39).
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tention and concentration difficulties, irritability, hyperactivity,
poor social and play skills, and in some cases, even aggression.13
Pilot programs designed to meet the educational needs of these
children are being implemented across the country. In Los Angeles,
a pilot preschool program for mildly impaired, prenatally drug-ex-
posed children has a per capita cost of $17,000 per year. (Compare
that cost with the $9,000 Los Angeles spends on each special edu-
cation student and the $4,000 for each regular student.))64 The
Washington, D.C., School District's 1991 budget designated
$403,000 for a pilot program that includes salaries for additional
teachers, educational aides, social workers, a physical therapist,
and a psychologist."5 The Florida Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services has estimated that, for drug-exposed children
who show significant physiologic or neurologic impairment, total
service costs to age 18 could be as high as $750,000.8
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRENATAL INJURY LAW IN
PENNSYLVANIA
In 1884, Dietrich v Inhabitants of Northampton7 became the
first case in the United States concerning a suit against a third
party for the negligent infliction of injury on an unborn child. The
cause of action was denied on the ground there was no precedent
for allowing recovery for prenatal injury; because the unborn child
was part of the mother, any damages to be recovered would be re-
covered by her.
After Dietrich and up until 1946, courts almost uniformly denied
recovery to the child for infliction of prenatal injuries." There was,
however, one 1924 Pennsylvania case, decided at the county level,
that allowed recovery for prenatal injury. Kine v Zuckerman 9 in-
volved a child born without a right hand, allegedly as a result of an
63. Staff of House Committee of Ways and Means, The Enemy Within at 67 (cited in
note 47); Los Angeles Unified School District, Division of Special Education, Prenatally Ex-
posed to Drugs (PED) Program, Today's Challenge, Teaching Strategies for Working with
Young Children Prenatally Exposed to Drugs/Alcohol' 1 (1990).
64. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman at 8 (cited in note 39); Los
Angeles Preparing for Drug Babies with Intervention Models, Education Daily 5 (August 2,
1990).
65. See Fighting the Good Fight in D.C. - the Need to Educate Boarder Babies,
Washington Post 8-B, col 3 (January 14, 1990).
66. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman at 8 (cited in note 39).
67. 138 Mass 14 (1884) (mother of a four- to five-month old fetus fell on a defect in a
highway and went into premature labor; baby died fifteen minutes after birth).
68. W. Page Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 55 at 367 (West, 5th ed 1984).
69. 4 Pa D & C 227 (Philadelphia County 1924).
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automobile collision one month before birth. The court quoted the
Blackstone Commentaries" for the proposition that an unborn
child was considered to be a person at common law for many legal
purposes. The court went on to say that the reason for imputing
personality to an unborn child-the protection of property
rights-is not nearly as important as the securing of his personal
welfare. 71 The court also noted that scientific research has estab-
lished that the fetus is an entity independent of the mother. It
then concluded that whether assignment of a legal personality is
based on scientific truth or legal fiction, the view is stronger when
dealing with the health of the individual, and his ability to perform
his duty as a citizen and a member of society, than when dealing
merely with property rights.72 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
did not share this view. In 1940 it decided in Berlin v J.C. Penney
Co., Inc.73 that there was "no warrant for holding, independent of a
statute, that a cause of action for pre-natal injuries to a child ac-
crues at birth.' '74 This one page opinion cited Dietrich and three
other cases from different jurisdictions,75 plus the Restatement,
76
but completely ignored Kine.
In 1946, the District Court for the District of Columbia changed
the law of prenatal injury with its decision. in Bonbrest v Kotz.7 7
The court held that a child injured during birth as a result of the
negligence of the attending physicians, but who survived such that
he was "viable," was a person with standing to sue for his injury.
70. "Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual;
and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's
womb.. . . An infant en ventra sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be
born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold estate,
made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited
to its use, and to take afterwards by such limitation as if it were then actually born." St.
George Tucker, ed, 2 Blackstone's Commentaries 129 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1969).
71. Kine, 4 Pa D & C at 228.
72. Id.
73. 339 Pa 547, 16 A2d 28 (1940).
74. Berlin, 16 A2d at 28.
75. These cases were Allaire v St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill 359, 56 NE 638 (1900);
Drobner v Peters, 232 NY 220, 133 NE 567 (1921); and Ryan v Public Service Coordinated
Transport, 18 NJ Misc 429, 14 A2d 52 (1940).
76. Restatement of Torts § 869 (1939), which reads:
A person who negligently causes harm to an unborn child is not liable to such child for the
harm. A person designated by statute to maintain an action for causing death cannot main-
tain an action for a negligent act committed before the birth of a child which causes the
death of the child either before or after birth.
Comment (a) to this section stated that the rule prevented recovery by the child after its
birth for any consequences of negligent conduct before birth.
77. 65 F Supp 138 (D DC 1946).
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Such child could not be denied recovery on the ground that he was
part of his mother. This decision reflected dissatisfaction with the
Dietrich line of cases for the reason that it was illogical to recog-
nize the separate existence of a child for purposes of criminal and
property law, but not for tort law.78 According to the Kotz court,
denial of such an action would allow the existence of a wrong for
which there would be no remedy.
79
In 1960 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled Berlin with
Sihkler v Kneale, ° wherein an action was allowed on behalf of an
infant born Mongoloid, allegedly as a result of injuries sustained in
an automobile accident as a one-month old fetus. The court noted
that other states require a fetus to have been viable when the inju-
ries were received; nonetheless, it rejected that notion, saying, "We
regard it as having little to do with the basic right to recover, when
the fetus is regarded as having an existence as a separate creature
from the moment of conception.
'81
Under Sinkler, there must have been a live birth to recover for a
prenatal injury. Consequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected recovery for a stillborn fetus under the Wrongful Death
Act 82 and Survival Statute8" in Carroll v Skloff,"I Marko v Phila-
delphia Transportation Company,"' and Scott v Kopp.86 In these
cases, the court took the position that the wrongful death action
was derivative and never intended to provide recovery for the es-
tate of an unborn fetus.87 In order for there to be a survival action,
there must have been an independent life in being, surviving birth,
78. Bonbrest, 65 F Supp at 141 (citing Montreal Tramways v Leveille, 4 Dom L R
337, 344 (1933): recovery was permitted to a child born with club feet whose mother fell
from a tram while pregnant as a result of the negligence of the tram operator).
79. Bonbrest, 65 F Supp at 141 (citing Leveille, 4 Dom L R at 345):
If a child after birth has no right of action for prenatal injuries, we have a wrong inflicted
for which there is no remedy . . .If a right of action be denied the child, it will be com-
pelled, without any fault on its part, to go through life carrying the seal of another's fault
and bearing a very heavy burden of infirmity and inconvenience without any compensation
therefor.
80. 401 Pa 267, 164 A2d 93 (1960).
81. Sinkler, 163 A2d at 96.
82. The current version of the Wrongful Death Act is found at 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §
8301(a) (Purdon 1982).
83. The current version of the Survival Statute is found at 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §
8302 (Purdon 1982).
84. 415 Pa 47, 202 A2d 9 (1964).
85. 420 Pa 124, 216 A2d 502 (1966).
86. 494 Pa 487, 431 A2d 959 (1981).
87. Scott, 431 A2d at 961 (citing Carroll v Skloff, 202 A2d 9, 10 (1964)).
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which could have brought the action prior to death.88 This formula
changed, however, in 1985 when Amadio v Levin' was decided.
In Amadio, the parents of a stillborn child delivered at least fif-
teen days beyond term brought an action against the mother's ob-
stetricians for their negligence in causing the child's death within
the womb. Reversing its prior holdings in Carroll, Marko, and
Scott, the court said, "No longer will we sanction a legal doctrine
that enables a tortfeasor who causes death to escape full liability,
while rendering one whose wrongdoing is less severe in its conse-
quences answerable in a wrongful death or other negligence action
merely because his victim survives birth." 90
Although the stillborn infant in Amadio was full-term and viable
at the time of the injury, the Amadio court did not clearly estab-
lish viability as the point in time when a fetus is given the status of
an individual for the purpose'of maintaining an action for his
death. In answer to this silence, two cases recently decided by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court have required viability at the time of
the fetus' death in order to sue under the wrongful death and sur-
vival statutes.9 '
For purposes of determining whether a child may have a cause of
action for injury inflicted upon him as a result of maternal sub-
stance abuse, the issue of viability is not relevant, as the child
would necessarily have to survive to bring the suit. Under the Sin-
kler analysis, a child would be considered to have been an individ-
ual from the moment of conception, so an injury inflicted upon the
child by his mother at any point of his existence would be
actionable.
IV. THE ABROGATION OF PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY IN
PENNSYLVANIA
The doctrine of parent-child tort immunity was simply a rule
that actions between parents and their minor children would not
be allowed for personal injuries, whether sustained from inten-
88. Scott, 431 A2d at 961.
89. 509 Pa 199, 501 A2d 1085 (1985).
90. Amadio, 501 A2d at 1088 (citing Hopkins v McBane, 359 NW2d 862 (ND 1984)).
91. Hudak v Gregory, 390 Pa Super 14, 567 A2d 1095 (1989), allocatur granted, 575
A2d 566 (1990) (superior court refused to allow a cause of action against a physician for the
death of three fetuses who were born alive but were so premature that they died shortly
after birth); Coveleski v Bubnis, 391 Pa Super 409, 571 A2d 433 (1990), allocatur granted,
582 A2d 323 (superior court denied suit to a woman who brought suit for the death of a
fetus that was aborted at eight weeks to avoid the risk of fetal damage after the woman was
injured in an automobile accident).
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tional actions or negligence. 2 There were no reported decisions ad-
hering to this rule prior to 1891, when a Mississippi court held in
Hewlett v George93 that a child could not sue her mother for mali-
ciously committing her to an asylum, because such an action would
destroy family peace and be against public policy."4 This case and
two others8 formed the basis for the parent-child immunity doc-
trine which was eventually followed in all states.
In Briggs v City of Philadelphia,96 the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania, citing McKelvey and Roller among other cases from vari-
ous states, noted that, although there was no common law rule
prohibiting children's suits against parents, such actions were dis-
ruptive of family peace, integrity, and discipline, and, therefore,
against public policy. (The Supreme Court later reversed this
case on another point.9 8 ) A year later in Duffy v Duffy,9 9 the Supe-
rior Court, citing Briggs, held that a mother could not sue her un-
emancipated minor son for injuries received while riding in a car
driven by him.
Besides public policy and preservation of the unity and integrity
of the family, the general reasons courts give for maintaining the
immunity doctrine are preservation of parental authority, preven-
tion of fraud and collusion, avoidance of the possibility that the
wrongdoer might inherit any recovery awarded to the child, deple-
tion of family resources, and the analogy to marital immunity. 100
The exceptions used to allow recovery in particular instances are
(1) the presence of liability insurance (because the suit would not
deplete the family's resources); (2) the death of either the parent
or child (because there would no longer be a relationship to pro-
tect); (3) or sustaining an injury in the course of a parent's busi-
92. Keeton, Torts § 122 at 904 (cited in note 68).
93. 68 Miss 703, 9 So 885 (1891).
94. Hewlett, 9 So at 887.
95. McKelvey v McKelvey, 111 Tenn 388; 77 SW 664 (1903) (child sued her step-
mother for physical injury resulting from cruel treatment) and Roller v Roller, 37 Wash 242,
79 P 788 (1905). In Roller the doctrine.was applied where a girl sued her father for rape,
despite the fact that there was no longer any family harmony to protect. The court was
concerned that the father could possibly inherit any recovery given to the girl and that other
children could suffer from the depletion of family resources. Roller, 79 P at 789.
96. 112 Pa Super 50, 170 A 871 (1934): The parents of a child who fell on a defective
sidewalk sued the city. The city joined the father and the landlord as additional defendants.
97. Briggs, 170 A at 872-73. .. .
98. Briggs v City of Philadelphia, 316 Pa 48, 173 A 316 (1934) (the judgment against
the landlord was reversed).
99. 117 Pa Super 500, 178 A 165 (1935).
100. Note, 10 Suffolk U L Rev at 593 (cited in note 21); Simon, 14 Colum J Law & Soc
Probs at 61-3 (cited in note 4); Beal, 21 San Diego L Rev at 335 (cited in note 14).
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ness (because, in this case, the injury would result from a business
relationship, not a familial one).'
In 1963, Wisconsin became the first state to abrogate the parent-
child immunity rule with its decision in Goiter v White.10 2 Al-
though the court found the prevalence of liability insurance af-
forded a basis for doing away with parental immunity,'0 3 it re-
tained two immunity exceptions: the exercise of parental authority
and the exercise of parental discretion in providing the child with
necessaries. 04
Soon after this Wisconsin decision, a number of states'0 5 began
to abrogate the doctrine altogether, or with certain exceptions
which retained immunity, as in Goller. In 1971 Pennsylvania fol-
lowed the total abrogation group with Falco v Pados.'0°
Although the Falco court could have allowed recovery on the
limited ground that the mother had not been directly sued by her
daughter, but was merely joined as an additional defendant, the
court seized the opportunity to do away with the immunity rule:
"We have concluded that the doctrine of parental immunity has no
rational purpose today, and henceforth will not be recognized in
Pennsylvania.' 0 7 As noted by the commonwealth court in Miller v
Leljedal,l05 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abrogated the doc-
101. Simon, 14 Colum J Law & Soc Probs at 165 (cited in note 4); see Minkin v
Minkin, 336 Pa 49, 7 A2d 461 (1939) (minor was allowed to maintain an action against his
mother for the death of the father under the wrongful death statute); Parks v Parks, 390 Pa
287, 135 A2d 65 (1957) (the fact that a parent had liability insurance was not a valid reason
for removing from children the disability to maintain actions against parents in
Pennsylvania).
102. 20 Wis 2d 402, 122 NW2d 193 (1963) (boy sued his foster father for injuries re-
ceived while riding on the drawbar of a tractor operated by the father).
103. Goller, 122 NW2d at 197.
104. Id at 198.
105. Alaska - Hebel v Hebel, 435 P2d 8 (1967); Arizona - Streenz v Streenz, 106 Ariz
86, 471 P2d 282 (1970); California - Gibson v Gibson, 92 Cal Rep 288, 479 P2d 648 (1971);
Hawaii - Tamashiro v DeGama, 450 P2d 998 (HI 1969); Kentucky - Rigdon v Rigdon, 465
SW2d 921 (KY 1971); Illinois - Schenk v Schenk; 100 I1 App 2d 199, 241 NE2d 12 (1969);
New Jersey - France v APA Transport Corp., 56 NJ 500, 267 A2d 490 (1970); New York -
Gelbman v Gelbman, 23 NY2d 434, 297 NYS 2d 529, 245 NE2d 192 (1969); for additional
cases see the listing in Falco v Pados, 444 Pa 372, 282 A2d 351 (1971).
106. 444 Pa 372, 282 A2d 351 (1971). This was an action for damages stemming from a
child's injuries received in an accident while she rode in a car driven by her mother. Al-
though the child originally sued the other driver, her mother was joined as an additional
defendant. Since the original defendant was judgment proof beyond his $10,000.00 liability
insurance coverage and the jury had awarded the child in excess of $28,000.00, the issue was
whether the mother's insurance could be garnished to satisfy the judgment.
107. Falco, 282 A2d at 353.
108. 71 Pa Commw 372, 455 A2d 256 (1983) (a mother who sued on behalf of her son
for injuries he received while crossing a highway was sued by the defendant on a third-party
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trine without qualification,109 unlike the Wisconsin court in Goller
v White.
The Falco court noted that legal scholars had long criticized the
view that suits between family members disrupt the family unit.
Such scholars indicated that the injury itself disrupts the family.
Moreover, since health care costs impose the greatest hardship,
needlessly imposing ruin on a family seems silly when liability in-
surance is almost universal. "'
The court also pointed out the paradox that Pennsylvania had
never prohibited suits between parents and children for breach of
contract or property matters-other areas where litigation may be-
come antagonistic - and yet, "protected" the family from the dis-
ruption of a personal injury suit. The court found illogical that a
child could assert his property rights against his parents, but have
no redress for injuries to his person."' This interest in freedom
from personal injury was also said to outweigh the danger of fraud
and collusion."
2
These last reasons for Pennsylvania's abrogation of parental tort
immunity were also used for allowing suits for prenatal injuries.
Pennsylvania recognizes a child's unqualified right to sue his par-
ents for negligent injury and the liability of third parties for prena-
tal injury. This dual recognition must mean that a child, injured
because of his mother's substance abuse during pregnancy, should
be allowed a cause of action against the mother.
V. ISSUES CONCERNING A CHILD'S CAUSE OF ACTION
The four elements of an action in negligence are the existence of
a duty, a breach of that duty, proximate cause, and actual loss or
damage." 3 A child seeking to bring suit for a prenatal injury must
satisfy each one of these elements.
In considering whether a child may sue his mother for prenatal
injuries, the most difficult problems are establishing the duty owed
to the child by the mother and setting the standard of care to de-
termine when that duty has been breached. Advances in embryol-
complaint, alleging that she had been negligent in the supervision of the boy).
109. Miller, 455 A2d at 259 (negligent supervision of a minor child by a parent is not
incognizable as a cause of action).
110. Falco, 282 A2d at 355.
111. Id.
112. Id at 355, n.9 (citing Tamashira v DeGama, 450 P2d 988, 1001-002 (1969) for the
idea that our judicial system is adequate to discover collusion and fraud when they occur).
113. Keeton, Torts § 30 at 164 (cited in note 68).
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ogy and increasing knowledge of maternal influences on fetal de-
velopment make proving a causal relationship between a woman's
abuse of a substance while pregnant and injury to the child no
more difficult than proving injury to a child in utero because of the
negligence of a third party." 4 As for determining damages, a court
should simply use the same analysis of evidence that it uses for
ordinary personal injury claims.1 5
Note that a claim for prenatal injury against a mother is not the
same as a suit for wrongful life, which is barred by statute in Penn-
sylvania." 6 Brought on behalf of a child born defective, the wrong-
ful life suit is based on a doctor's failure to detect the possibility
and notify the parents that, because of a disease contracted by the
mother" 7 or a genetic condition," 8 a defective child may be
born;" 9 because of this failure to detect and notify, the parents are
not given the opportunity to terminate the pregnancy."*° Although
some courts perceive the claim as an assertion of a right to be born
as a whole, functional human being,'' the plaintiffs in these
wrongful life actions are really claiming the right not to be born at
all."'22 The essence of their complaint is the physician's failure to
diagnose the defect and inform the parents, such that they could
have spared the plaintiff from the disease or deformity by aborting
or preventing conception in the first place.2 3
Actions such as these are barred on public policy grounds. Soci-
ety places such a great value on life that life of any quality has
114. Id section 55 at 369; Note, 10 Suffolk U L Rev at 606 (cited in note 21).
115. Note, 10 Suffolk U L Rev at 590 (cited in note 21).
116. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 8305(B) (Purdon Supp 1990), which reads: There shall be
no cause of action on behalf of any person based on a claim of that person that but for an
act or omission of the defendant, the person conceived, would or should have been aborted.
117. Gleitman v Cosgrove, 49 NJ 22, 227 A2d 689 (1967): child's mother contracted
German measles in her first month of pregnancy. Her doctor advised her that there would
be no ill effects on the fetus, although he knew there was a possibility of birth defects.
Subsequently, the child was born with visual, aural, and speech defects.
118. Guildiner v Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 451 F Supp 692 (E D Pa
1978) (a child was born with Tay-Sachs disease after tests that were performed while it was
in utero showed it to be normal).
119. J. Douglas Peters and Brian M. Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective
Child's Right to a Cause of Action, 18*Duquesne L Rev 857, 857 (1980).
120. Keeton, Torts § 55 at 370 (cited in note 68).
121. Thomas DeWitt Rogers, III, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Mal-
practice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 SC L Rev 713, 716 (1982). See
also, Speck v Finegold, 268 Pa Super 342, 364, 408 A2d 496, 508 (1979).
122. Peters and Peters, 18 Duquesne L Rev at 719 (cited in note 119).
123. Rogers, 33 SC L Rev at 719 (cited in note 121).
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been considered to be of greater value than non-existence.' 24 After-
all, how can society afford a remedy to a defective child where the
only alternative is not to have been born at all? 25
This is not the case with a claim against a mother for injury to a
child in utero due to' substance abuse during pregnancy, because
here the alternative to the resultant impaired life is a healthy one.
The child was not conceived with a defect or harmed by an illness
through no fault of his mother. On the contrary, a drug-exposed
child would have been healthy had it not been for the mother's
actions. While society values any life over no life, it prefers a
healthy life to an impaired one. When a woman has chosen to
carry a pregnancy to term, the state has a legitimate interest in
promoting the quality of life of the unborn child.'2 6 This principle
is consistent' with the public interest of avoiding handicaps caused
by the negligent infliction of injury,1 27 and is exactly the gravamen
of the complaint in the prenatal injury context: but for the defend-
ant's negligent action, the plaintiff would not have been injured
and, therefore, would have been born unimpaired. In light of soci-
ety's interest and the rights of the child, suits against mothers for
injuries to their unborn children caused by substance abuse during
pregnancy should not be barred by Pennsylvania's wrongful life
statute.
A. The Duty to the Child
In Pennsylvania, parents have a duty to provide care, love, and
support for their children. 2 8 This duty of support is considered to
be "well nigh absolute;"' 29 parents are expected to sacrifice luxu-
ries for themselves to provide for their children's needs.3 0 These
needs have been held to include, even a college education, if the
parents have sufficient resources to support the child through col-
lege without hardship.'
3 '
124. Peters and Peters, 18 Duquesne L Rev at 861 (cited in note 119).
125. Id.
126. Parness, 22 Harv J on Legis at 114 (cited in.note 9).
127. Id.
128. Appeal of Diane B., 456 Pa 429, 433, 321 A2d 618, 620 (1974).
129. Albert Momjian and Norman Perlberger, Pennsylvania Family Law § 6.10.2(a)
(1982) (citing Firestone v Firestone, 158 Pa Super 579, 45 A2d 923 (1946)); Gitman v
Gitman, 428 Pa 387, 237 A2d 181 (1967).
130. Sutliff v Sutliff, 339 Pa Super 523, 489 A2d 764, appeal granted, 509 Pa 436, 502
A2d 1231, affirmed and remanded, 515 Pa 393, 528 A2d 1318 (1986).
131. Hesidenz v Carbin, 354 Pa Super 610, 512 A2d 707 (1986); Leonard v Leonard,
353 Pa Super 604, 510 A2d 827 (1986).
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On one hand, parents who fail to provide necessaries to their
children may be held liable to those third parties that do, 3 2 and in
extreme cases of failure to perform parental duties, involuntary
termination of parental rights may result.13 On the other hand,
discretion in the performance of parental duties is not unlimited
by the state. The state may, as parens patrie, restrict the parents'
control in several ways,134 e.g., requiring school attendance, regu-
lating or prohibiting child labor and limiting the physical punish-
ment of a child.135 Pennsylvania law should mandate that these pa-
rental duties and limits on discretion begin not at birth, but rather
as soon as the parents become aware of the pregnancy and decide
not to terminate it.
138
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that a state
has an interest in the potential life and health of a fetus.'37 New
Jersey has acted to appoint a guardian for a fetus who could con-
sent to medical treatment upon the child's birth, on the ground
that denial of such treatment would constitute child abuse. 3 8 New
Jersey has also authorized treatment to a mother against her
wishes for the benefit of a fetus.'3 9 Situations such as these can
only become more common with advances in intrauterine
medicine.
Some courts have found that an unborn child may be considered
a person for purposes of defining a father's duty to support his
children. In People v Sianes,"4 ° for example, a California court rea-
soned that because of the unborn child's total dependence on the
mother for growth and survival, a father's failure to provide neces-
132. Warner v Warner, 198 Pa Super 124, 181 A2d 888 (1962) (a doctor who provides
medical treatment to children may directly sue their father for payment).
133. Momjian and Perlberger, Pennsylvania Family Law at § 4.3 (cited in note 129);
23 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2511(a)(1) & (2)..(Purdon 1988 & Supp 1989).
134. In Re Green, 448 Pa 338, 342, 292 A2d 387, 389 (1972) (quoting Prince v Massa-
chusetts, 321 US 158, 166-67, 64 S Ct 438, 442 (1944)).
135. Child Protective Services Law, 11 Pa Stat § 2201 et seq (Purdon 1988 & Supp
1989); Boland v Leska, 308 Pa Super 169, 454 A2d 75 (1982); Seyler v Pennsylvania Board
of Probation and Parole, 97 PaCommw 302, 509 A2d 438 (1985) (a parolee was recommit-
ted for failing to refrain from assaultive behavior when he whipped his stepson with a belt).
136. Simon, 14 Colum J Law & Soc Probs at 81 (cited in note 4); Note, 10 Suffolk U L
Rev at 598 (cited in note 21) (parents do not have an unqualified privilege over the fetus in
that abortion may not take place after viability, except for the mother's health, and author-
ity may be obtained for medical treatment for the benefit of the fetus).
137. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 154 (1973).
138. Hoener v Bertinado, 67 NJ Super 517, 171 A2d 140 (1961).
139. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v Anderson, 42 NJ 421, 201 A2d
537 (1964), cert denied, 377 US 985.
140. 134 Cal App 355, 25 P2d 487 (1933).
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sities to the mother was a failure to provide them to the child.1 '
The duty of parents to unborn children should not stop at the
provision of necessaries. The duty should also work to protect the
child from injury, no matter who inflicts it. Just as a father is re-
quired to provide for the mother to ensure the sound development
of his unborn child, so should the mother be held to a similar
duty. 142
Likewise, if an outside party can be held liable for injury to a
child in utero, it seems illogical for the mother to escape liability
simply because she is the mother. This is especially true in the case
of substance abuse during pregnancy, because only the mother can
prevent the injury. Recognition of such a duty on the part of the
mother would be consistent with the policies set forth in those
cases abrogating parental immunity and recognizing recovery for
prenatal injuries.
143
B. The Standard of Care: A Balance Between the Mother's
Rights and Those of the Child
The problem of determining the standard of care that a preg-
nant woman should be held to with respect to her unborn child is
one of balancing the woman's right to control her body' 44 against
the child's right not to be subjected to unreasonable risks while in
utero. 145 As one court noted, "[T]he essence of prenatal rights, in
the context of a maternal duty of care, is the right to be born with
a sound mind and body.'1
46
Opponents of the idea of a child's suit against his mother for
prenatal injury see the imposition of a duty of care on the mother
as an undue restraint on a woman's right to privacy and personal
autonomy with respect to her pregnancy. (These rights were out-
lined in Roe v Wade.)147 They argue that in Roe, the United States
Supreme Court held that a fetus is not a person under the Four-
teenth Amendment, so that any legal recognition of the fetus
should not be able to infringe on a woman's constitutional rights of
141. Sianes, 25 P2d at 488.
142. Note, 10 Suffolk U L Rev at 605 (cited in note 21).
143. Beal, 21 San Diego L Rev at 357 (cited in note 14) (the most important policies
are that a child has the right to be born with a sound mind and body, and that a child
should not be denied redress for a wrong done to him solely for his relationship to the
wrongdoer).
144. Note, 10 Suffolk U L Rev at 605 (cited in note 21).
145. Comment, 20 John Marshall L Rev at 754 (cited in note 5).
146. Id at 748 (quoting Smith v Brennan, 31 NJ 353, 364, 157 A2d 497, 503 (1960)).
147. 410 US 113 (1973).
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liberty and privacy." 8 Moreover, the opponents contend that
women who choose not to have abortions are those most likely to
care very much about the welfare of the unborn child and will con-
sider the potential harmful effects that may result from their ac-
tions during pregnancy, thus making any form of state interference
in this area burdensome and unnecessary.'
4 9
While this concern may be real for most expectant mothers,
some women, especially those whose habits include substance
abuse, will not act in the best interests of their unborn children,
just as some parents of born children can be neglectful. Even in
the Roe decision, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to
privacy is not unlimited,150 and that because there is potential life
carried within the pregnant woman, her right to control her body is
not absolute.15' Indeed, after the point of viability, the state may
go so far as to enforce its interest in protecting potential life. 152
Clearly then, recognition of a woman's right to privacy, personal
autonomy, and abortion should not mean that a woman is totally
free to abuse her body and her unborn child such that permanent
harm to the child results.
Because of the integral role a mother's care of her body during
pregnancy plays in fetal development, a woman's right to control
her body ought to be restricted for the welfare of her child once
the decision has been made not to abort.'5 ' Although some com-
mentators maintain that policies of this type perpetuate a system
of sex discrimination and a denial of equal protection to women, "
they really are no different from any other policy or law that limits
personal freedom for the protection of others.1 55 In the context of
the substance-abusing pregnant woman, the conduct sought to be
148. Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 Yale L J 599, 600 (1986); Jeffrey A.
Parness, The Abuse and Neglect of the Human Unborn: Protecting Potential Life, 20 Famn
L Q 197, 198 (1986).
149. Note, 95 Yale L J at 613 (cited in note 148).
150. Roe, 410 US at 154.
151. Note, 10 Suffolk U L Rev at 603 (cited in note 21) (citing Roe v Wade, 410 US at
159).
152. Roe, 410 US at 164.
153. Note, 10 Suffolk U L Rev at 583 (cited in note 21).
154. Note, 95 Yale L J at 613 (cited in note 148).
155. Note, 10 Suffolk U L Rev at 604 (cited in note 21) (prohibitions on the use and
sale of drugs, drunk driving laws, criminal laws, etc.); Simon, 14 Colum J Law & Soc Probs
at 82 (cited in note 4) (society has an interest in avoiding collective financial responsibility
for a loss due to a person's negligence); Parness, 22 Harv J on Legis 97 (cited in note 9) (the
state's promotion of the unborn's quality of life is consistent with the general public interest
of avoidance and elimination of handicaps).
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restricted may be considered socially undesirable (as in the case of
alcoholism) or illegal (as in drug use). Furthermore, these restric-
tions on personal freedom are not based on gender (although it is
true that only women bear children), but rather on the duties aris-
ing from the status of parenthood.
In order to find that a person has been negligent in'the discharge
of his duties, his conduct must have fallen below what a reasonable
person in like circumstances would have done.1"' The harm result-
ing from the conduct must have been foreseeable by a prudent per-
son. 57 The state of medical knowledge with regard to fetal devel-
opment determines foreseeability in the prenatal injury context,
because a reasonable pregnant woman would consider this medical
information in making decisions about her conduct during
pregnancy.1 58
To determine the standard of conduct to be applied to the par-
ent in prenatal injury situations, a risk benefit analysis must be
done. One must balance the risk of harm to the fetus, in the light
of the social value of the protection of potential life and the
probability and extent of such harm, .against the value of the inter-
ests of privacy and personal autonomy of the mother. 59
One suggested standard of care is that of the reasonably prudent
expecting parent.160 This standard requires that the parents con-
form their conduct in accordance with common knowledge, much
like the ordinary reasonable person standard. This standard would
come into effect when the parents knew, or had reason to know, of
the pregnancy, because that is when the duties of parenthood
should arise.1 61 In Grodin v Grodin6 12.a Michigan court applied a
similar standard of reasonable parental discretion as used in ordi-
nary parent-child actions, but it held that the duty of the mother
to prevent injury began at conception. The imposition of a duty at
conception seems unfair and unduly restrictive to women, because
156. Keeton, Torts § 32 at 174 (cited in note 68).
157. Id section 31 at 170.
158. Simon, 14 Colum J Law & Soc Probs at 85 (cited in note 4).
159. Keeton, Torts § 32 at 173 (cited in note 68).
160. Simon, 14 Colum J Law & Soc Probs at 85 (cited in note 4).
161. Id at 87; Beal, 21 San Diego L Rev at 364 (cited in note 14) (expresses the con-
cern that a woman could be held to a standard of conduct toward her body before the duty
of parenthood arises, because of the ability to conceive); Comment, 20 John Marshall L Rev
at 757 (cited in note 5) (it is foreseeable that most women will one day become pregnant,
such that they could be held liable to a standard of care throughout their childbearing
years).
162. 102 Mich App 396, 301 NW2d 869 (1980).
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women are often not aware of pregnancy until weeks after concep-
tion. Critics of this approach point out that what is reasonable
with respect to parenting can vary greatly along economic, cultural,
and religious lines. 16 3 Arguably, this standard is too restrictive of
personal liberty because a woman could be held liable for conduct
that the ordinary person would not think twice about, such as tak-
ing aspirin or drugs prescribed by a doctor, or even household
accidents.
164
A standard thought to achieve a balancing of interests more
favorable to the woman is that of gross negligence, which is an al-
most conscious disregard for the fetus.1 5 Gross negligence would
be found when the probability that the conduct engaged in could
cause injury to the child was high and the cost or difficulty of
preventing the injury low.1" This standard would be particularly
appropriate where suit against a mother for injury arising out of
the use of a substance during her pregnancy is contemplated; in
such cases, courts would impose liability for this intentional con-
duct that society has an interest in deterring, but not for otherwise
harmless activities through which a woman may unwittingly injure
her child. According to one law review commentator:
There is an important distinction between not punishing, or denying civil
recovery for unintentional conduct that results in a damaged child, and re-
dressing intentional conduct that injures a child. Alcohol, drug, and tobacco
abuse constitute intentional acts that the mother has the ability to
prevent.16
The gross negligence standard seems to strike an appropriate bal-
ance-protecting the mother's privacy and liberty interests from
undue restriction, while still allowing recovery to a child injured in
utero because of the mother's total lack of concern for his well-
being.
163. Note, 20 John Marshall L Rev at 759 (cited in note 5); In Re Green, 448 Pa 338,
292 A2d 387 (1972) (a parent may refuse medical treatment for a child on religious grounds
where the child's life is not in danger).
164. Note, 10 Suffolk U L Rev at 607 (cited in note 21).
165. Id.
166. Id. See also, Keeton, Torts § 34 at 211 (cited in note 68).
167. Note, 60 S Cal L Rev at 1237 (cited in note 9). A question to consider is whether
this reasoning should apply to automobile cases as well. See Stallman v Youngquist, 473
NE2d 400 (Ill App 1984) (the court would allow an infant to sue its mother for injuries
resulting from an automobile accident when the child was a five-month old fetus, if the
mother's act of driving to a restaurant did not arise out of the family relationship, because




Pennsylvania law clearly suggests that third party tortfeasors
causing injury to a child in utero may be held liable for their negli-
gence, without regard to the child's viability at the time of the in-
jury."6' At the same time, the parent-child immunity doctrine has
been abrogated, without exception for the exercise of parental dis-
cretion. If a case should come up where a child asserts a cause of
action against his mother for prenatal injury caused by her sub-
stance abuse during pregnancy, the next logical step, given the pro-
gression of the law in Pennsylvania thus far, would be to allow the
child to maintain his action.
The reasons for allowing this suit are the same as those for al-
lowing suits against third parties for prenatal injuries and between
parents and children for personal injuries. Most important is the
notion that a child has a right to be born healthy and free from
injury. To deny a cause of action is to have a wrong for which there
is no remedy.6 9 Second, to think that a child's property rights can
be protected, but not his well-being, defies common sense. 170 Also,
the danger of fraud in these cases would be no greater than in any
other suit for prenatal injury or between parents and children.1
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Medical science is ever expanding the knowledge of how a wo-
man may affect the health of her unborn child. Studies have al-
ready shown that substance abuse during pregnancy can have per-
manent debilitating effects on the fetus. Such injury-causing
conduct is unacceptable. The law should be blind to the fact that
the culpable party is the mother, rather than an outsider. Once she
is aware that she is pregnant and has made the decision not to
terminate the pregnancy, a mother should be held to the duty
Pennsylvania law imposes on parents "to exercise reasonable care
to protect their children and keep them from danger."
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Defining the point at which the duty is breached becomes a
problem because of the liberty interest of the mother. The stan-
dard of a reasonable expecting. parent may be too restrictive of
personal rights. Gross negligence, on the other hand, constitutes a
168. See text accompanying notes 89 and .90.
169. Smith v Brennan, 31 NJ 353, 157 A2d 497 (1960); Bonbrest v Kotz, 65 F Supp
138 (D DC 1946). .
170. See note 111 and accompanying text; Falco v Pados, 444 Pa 372, 282 A2d 351
(1971).
171. See Falco in note 106.
172. Miller v Leljedal, 71 Pa Commw 372, 455 A2d 256 (1983) (citing Goldberg v Phil-
adelphia Rapid Transit Co., 299 Pa 79; 149 A 104 (1930)).
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workable balance between the right of the child to be healthy and
that of the mother to control her life.
A final consideration is who will be affected by suits of this na-
ture. Obviously, these actions will be brought only where there are
financial resources to justify them. 1' 3 Unlike most automobile
cases, many families may not have insurance to cover this type of
injury. Only people who are financially well-off may be swayed by
the deterrent effect of a possible prenatal tort claim, or be able to
compensate the child harmed by their substance abuse. Children
who do not come from affluent families also need protection.
Considering the great-cost to society as a whole in terms of med-
ical treatment, special education, loss of productivity, and other
avoidable costs associated with drug and alcohol-related birth de-
fects, there exist options in addition to tort recovery the Common-
wealth might consider to protect unborn children from harm. One
suggested solution is to include abuse of the unborn in the statu-
tory definition of child abuse, and to place newborns who show
signs of drug and alcohol exposure in the state's custody. 174 An-
other solution advocated by some legal scholars is the imposition
of criminal sanctions for fetal abuse.'7 Professionals who work
with pregnant addicts disagree with these methods, however. They
point out that the fear of incarceration and the loss of their chil-
dren to foster care will discourage many pregnant women from
seeking the drug treatment and prenatal care that they so desper-
ately need in order to have healthy babies.176 Moreover, taking
children who test positive for prenatal drug exposure from their
mothers and placing them in the custody of the state would only
173. A similar situation was present in Glomb v Glomb, 366 Pa Super 206, 530 A2d
1362 (1987), where a child sued her parents through a guardian ad litem for negligently
hiring a babysitter who beat the one-year old to the point of unconsciousness, causing brain
damage. The court found that the parents were not entitled to apportionment of the liabil-
ity with the sitter, and that the $1.5 million award was not excessive.
174. See NJ Stat Ann § 30:4C-11 (West 1981), which allows a parent or someone hav-
ing a special interest in the child to apply to the Bureau of Children's Services. The Bureau
can then take care or custody of an unborn child, if that child's welfare is endangered. See
also, Matter of Baby X, 97 Mich App 111, 293 NW2d 736 (1980), in which a child exhibited
signs of drug withdrawal after birth. The state petitioned the court for temporary custody.
Custody was granted to the state on the finding that a newborn suffering such withdrawal as
a consequence of prenatal maternal drug addiction may be considered a neglected child.
175. See Parness, 22 Harv J on Legis at 146-50 (cited in note 9); Parness, 20 Fain L Q
at 201-05 (cited in note 148); Note, 60 S Cal L Rev at 1235-236 (cited in note 9).
176. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman at 9 (cited in note 39);
telephone interview with Ed Zubrow, drug advisor to the Superintendent, School District of
Philadelphia (October 29, 1990); telephone interview with Carol E. Tracy, Esquire, Execu-
tive Director, Mayor's Commission on Women, City of Philadelphia (September 18, 1990).
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serve to increase the boarder baby population in hospitals and fur-
ther overwhelm the foster care system.'
7 7
Comprehensive drug and alcohol treatment and education pro-
grams for pregnant women may constitute a better way to deal
with, and in many cases prevent, the problems and impairments
that are associated with prenatal drug exposure. A major short-
coming in most existing programs is that they are meant to serve
male addicts and make no accommodation for pregnant women,
their children, .or their special health needs.' a7 A 1990 survey con-
ducted by the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug
Abuse Directors, Inc., estimated that of 280,000 pregnant women
who were in need of treatment nationwide, less than 11% of them
were able to obtain care.17 9 Many experts believe that more drug
treatment programs and adequate prenatal care should be pro-
vided in order to minimize the risk of impairment due to maternal
substance abuse and reduce its associated cost.180
Whatever the other alternatives considered might be, recognition
of a child's cause of action for injury as a result of maternal sub-
stance abuse is a necessary next step in the law of prenatal torts in
Pennsylvania, if the state is to fulfill the goal of protecting the
right of a child to be born sound of mind and body.
177. Miller, Zero to Three at 22 (cited in note 40).
178. Tracy, Talbert, and Steinschneider, Women, Babies, and Drugs at 6 (cited in
note 58); Carol E. Tracy, Women, Abuse, Addiction and Public Policy., Special Currents 4
(Ross Laboratories 1990).
179. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman at 9 (cited in note 39).
180. Id at 8, 10; Finnegan, Special Currents: Maternal Addiction at 3 (cited in note
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